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ABSTRACT 
September 11, 2001 thrust the fire service into the world of intelligence but the 
evolution of its involvement has been slow and challenging. The evolving role in 
the intelligence process presents unprecedented challenges. This expanded role 
has presented an opportunity to contribute to the homeland security prevention 
and protection mission in addition to their traditionally recognized role in 
response and recovery. 
As fire service participation expands and the macro level sharing of 
intelligence between the fire service and the intelligence/law enforcement 
communities becomes more recognized as a matter of course, it will be 
necessary for fire service agencies also to develop internal mechanisms of 
disseminating intelligence to field level personnel. If field level personnel do not 
receive timely, credible, and actionable information, driven by the intelligence 
process, before, during and after an incident, their lives, as well as the lives of 
the public they are trying to help, can be jeopardized. 
This thesis presents research to answer the question, “how can 
information and intelligence be better disseminated to local first responders to 
enhance situational awareness, provide a higher degree of responder safety, and 
better protect the public?” Structured interviews were conducted to examine 
existing models being used to disseminate intelligence to first responders who 
were surveyed to determine what type of intelligence they preferred to receive, 
and in what format they would prefer to receive it. The findings revealed that first 
responders want intelligence products in an easily accessible concise format 
available in real time. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
September 11, 2001 thrust the fire service1 into the world of intelligence 
but the evolution of its involvement has been slow and challenging. Perhaps the 
reason for this has been, from the intelligence community (IC) and law 
enforcement perspectives, that the fire service should normally receive 
intelligence only when it is absolutely necessary or specifically requested. The 
intelligence requirements are different for law enforcement and the fire service. 
Law enforcement needs intelligence to prevent criminal and terrorist acts from 
occurring. The fire service needs intelligence to reduce the risks to their 
personnel and to be better prepared for responses to a terrorist attack to save 
the most lives. This difference in requirements leads to a recognition that 
mechanisms are needed to enable the distribution of intelligence and information 
in a timely and efficient manner so that the different consumers receive what they 
need to accomplish their missions.  
The major information and intelligence-sharing gap that needs to be filled 
is between the law enforcement community and their fire service counterparts. 
Several federal initiatives are attempting to fill this gap, including the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Intelligence & Analysis, the U.S. Fire 
Administration’s Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise (FSIE) and the DHS Office 
of Infrastructure Protection’s Emergency Services Sector Information Sharing 
Working Group, among others. These initiatives have focused mainly on 
promoting the integration of fire and emergency services intelligence interests 
into state and local fusion centers. Fusion centers comprised of multi-discipline 
personnel have become the major intelligence analysis, information sharing, and 
                                            




exchange conduits between the IC and law enforcement. The fire service is still 
struggling to become a full partner in this process. Further study is necessary to 
understand how the fire service can become a full and contributing partner. If this 
gap can be filled, the right information quickly reaches field personnel and 
becomes more relevant to the strategic and tactical decision makers, who can 
provide a better level of safety and preparedness for all emergency service 
personnel. 
B. BACKGROUND  
A formal process for sharing intelligence and homeland security related 
information with the fire service at the federal, state, local, and tribal levels began 
in 2007 when the FSIE was created. The FSIE was established by DHS because 
both the IC and the fire service recognized that firefighters played an important 
role in the intelligence process. The goal of this initiative was to enable the 
integration of the fire service into state and local fusion centers (FSIE Concept 
Plan, 2009, p. ii). DHS and the fire service recognized that an improvement in 
two-way communications for information sharing to occur was necessary.  
This initiative has been a step forward in the evolution of the relationship 
between the fire service and the IC. The information and intelligence sharing 
relationships for the fire service continue to be better defined and a better 
understanding of the appropriate role of the fire service within the intelligence 
cycle is developing.  
If first responders are to receive sensitive information, some concerns of 
the law enforcement community and the general public are the protection of 
privacy, the possibility of compromising law enforcement investigations, and the 
possibility of exposing IC or law enforcement sources. This is a legitimate 
concern but an argument can be made that a precedent exists, in that firefighters 
and EMS personnel have experience in managing confidential information 
(Cloud, 2008, p. 58). This area warrants further research because firefighters are 
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traditionally regarded as some of the most trustworthy public servants. To erode 
that public confidence might diminish the argument for a collaborative information 
sharing process.  
The National Strategy for Information Sharing acknowledges that 
homeland security activities and counterterrorism have become a daily activity 
within local response agencies. The Strategy specifically states, “they require 
access to timely, credible, and actionable information and intelligence about 
individuals and groups intending to carry out attacks within the United States” 
(National Strategy for Information Sharing, 2007, p. 17).  
C.  RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can information and intelligence be better disseminated to local first 
responders to enhance situational awareness, provide a higher degree of 
responder safety, and better protect the public? To answer this question, this 
thesis examines existing models being used to disseminate intelligence to first 
responders in a timely and efficient manner. After examining the existing models 
in a comparative analysis, recommendations are developed for an improved 
model. 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
The fire service’s evolving role in the intelligence process presents 
unprecedented challenges. This expanded role has presented an opportunity to 
contribute to the homeland security prevention and protection mission in addition 
to their traditionally recognized role in response and recovery. As rich sources of 
expertise, fire service personnel can assist law enforcement in identifying 
possible threats. Becoming effective consumers of intelligence, firefighters can 




Law enforcement and the intelligence community have begun to recognize 
the benefit of fire service experience. Efforts have started to formalize the 
information and intelligence sharing relationship and to build a more collaborative 
information-sharing network. Recent federal, state, and local information sharing 
initiatives have been major steps forward in the process. The goal of these 
initiatives is to achieve widespread and meaningful fire service integration in 
state and local fusion centers, and other information sharing networks, by 
establishing protocols and standards to support federal, state, and local efforts. 
By identifying best practices, more fire service agencies might begin the process 
of developing partnerships with their local fusion centers and intelligence/law 
enforcement professionals. It would be a significant accomplishment to contribute 
to the development of a fire service model of information sharing; specifically, a 
model for timely and effective dissemination that can be used throughout the 
United States. The purpose of this thesis is to recommend an effective model for 
dissemination of intelligence that can be used as a reference for fire service 
agencies if they make a decision to invest in an intelligence enterprise within their 
organizations. 
E. HYPOTHESIS 
This thesis hypothesizes that in order for the nation’s fire service to 
continue to evolve as a valuable partner with the IC, it needs to take the steps 
required to participate in the information sharing process and become better 
consumers of intelligence.  
Closing this gap is important so that the fire service can reduce risk to its 
members and be better prepared in advance of a terrorist attack, or any other 
disaster situation confronted. Enhanced preparedness is essential to the core 




The process of improving the sharing of intelligence has begun at the 
federal, state, and local levels through multiple initiatives developed in 
recognition that the fire service is a valuable partner in every phase of the 
intelligence cycle by virtue of their duties at fires, emergencies, and medical 
responses everyday nationwide. 
It is important for the IC and law enforcement to have the ability to 
communicate terrorism/criminal related information and intelligence to the fire 
service to enhance their level of preparedness, inform their response operations, 
and support the protection of first responder personnel. This two-way process is 
still evolving, and continues to evolve as information-sharing initiatives become 
more mature and better support the development of communities of interest at 
the federal, state, and local levels. Currently, 72 established intelligence fusion 
centers exist in the United States. A recent report by the DHS indicates that the 
integration of the fire service into this information and intelligence-sharing 
network is progressing. As of October 2009, varying degrees of fire service 
participation occurred in 48 out of 72 fusion centers (DHS I&A Report, 2009). 
As fire service participation expands, and the macro level sharing of 
intelligence between the fire service and the intelligence/law enforcement 
communities becomes more recognized as a matter of course, it is then 
necessary for fire service agencies to develop internal mechanisms of 
disseminating intelligence to field level personnel. If they do not receive timely, 
credible, and actionable information, driven by the intelligence process, prior to 
and during response operations to all hazards incidents, their lives, as well as the 
lives of the public they are trying to help, can be jeopardized. Situational 
awareness of incidents is critical to responder and public safety.  
Two areas of concern need to be addressed when developing the 
capability of sharing sensitive or classified information as determined by the 
producers of intelligence: 
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• The need for fire service personnel at different levels of command 
within an organization to possess a security clearance. Classified 
Information may contain information relevant to firefighters and/or 
EMS personnel at the executive levels and in the field. Relevant fire 
service personnel need to be trained on how to handle this type of 
intelligence and must possess the necessary clearances to access 
it. Fire service personnel also need to be cognizant of the dangers 
related to compromising law enforcement investigations. Law 
enforcement relies on sources for information. It also needs to 
protect its sources from media exposure during investigations. Fire 
service personnel trusted with handling this type of intelligence 
should receive training in this regard. An alternative to requiring 
security clearances may be to train analysts to sanitize intelligence 
to lower classifications for consumption, being mindful to keep it 
actionable.  
• For the fire service to be effective participants in the intelligence 
process, it must be aware that its typical good standing with the 
public can become compromised. Fire service personnel given 
intelligence responsibilities need to be aware of the constitutional 
boundaries surrounding these issues in the performance of this 
new activity. If the fire service becomes identified as being a part of 
the intelligence process, what traditionally has been viewed as a 
trustworthy relationship, can be eroded. If firefighters become 
perceived as engaging in what has typically been a law 
enforcement capacity during the course of their duties, the public 
may be less willing to allow them access to their premises.  
By analyzing a sample of fire service agencies around the country that 
have made efforts to participate in the intelligence process, the author can then 
research the hypothesis that, in order for the nation’s fire service to continue to 
evolve as a valuable partner with the IC, it needs to take the steps necessary to 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The IC and the law enforcement community have only recently realized 
the value of the fire service as a partner in the intelligence discipline. Due to this 
new and emerging relationship, relatively little literature or scholarship about how 
information should be shared between the intelligence/law enforcement 
communities and the fire service exists. The literature review includes the 
following sections. 
• Identifying Intelligence Requirements discusses current 
initiatives to determine what and how information should be shared 
between the intelligence/law enforcement communities and the fire 
service. 
• Application of Intelligence for Planning and Operations 
presents the intelligence cycle as a tool to be used for creating 
intelligence products for a wide range of public safety and 
emergency services organizations.  
• Mechanisms for Disseminating Information and Intelligence 
covers existing mechanisms to deliver intelligence to the 
firefighters. 
• Information/Intelligence Classification Barriers discusses 
understanding the process of security clearances and how 
information is categorized. 
• The Role of Training Programs explains the need for training for 
this new and non-traditional relationship between the fire service 
and the intelligence/law enforcement communities, including the 
appropriate stages of the intelligence cycle for fire service 
participation. 
A. IDENTIFYING INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS 
Work has commenced at the federal, state, and local levels to identify the 




The process for disseminating intelligence to the fire service can only be 
successful if the fire service can identify what type of information and intelligence 
it needs, as well as the importance of participating in the analysis stage of the 
intelligence cycle. This participation assists in the production of intelligence 
reports relevant to the fire service.  
In April of 2009, DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), Office of 
Infrastructure Protection (IP), and the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) held a 
workshop to discuss emergency services sector information and intelligence 
requirements. Participants were from a cross-section of emergency services 
disciplines including fire, rescue, hazardous materials, law enforcement, 
emergency medical service, and emergency management personnel. The after 
action report of the workshop revealed several issues.  
• It was recognized, that at present, a universal lack of understanding 
of what each discipline within the emergency services does, and 
what exactly the IC does exists. What should the relationship look 
like? Many cross-disciplinary intelligence requirements abound, but 
each discipline also has unique requirements for intelligence.  
• It was articulated that intelligence analysts generally do not 
understand the role of those in the emergency services and how 
the emergency services can be a valuable partner in the fusion 
process (DHS Workshop 2009, p. 7). This represents a serious gap 
in the ability of the IC to become a producer of intelligence useful to 
the emergency services. 
B. APPLICATION OF INTELLIGENCE FOR PLANNING AND 
OPERATIONS 
The role of the fire service is relevant in every part of the intelligence 
cycle. Intelligence requirements are defined in the planning phase, and then the 
corresponding information needs identified. Collection is relevant for suspicious 
activity reporting (within the confines of the law), and sharing of internal fire 
department information, such as information obtained from performing building 
inspections or what is observed during the course of normal response activities. 
Fire service personnel can provide their subject matter expertise to produce more 
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relevant intelligence products for fire service personnel consumption. 
Dissemination is relevant because fire service personnel are intelligence 
customers and consumers and may be able to identify other important 
consumers to enhance responder and public safety. Evaluation of intelligence 
products is critical to let analysts know if the fire service is obtaining what it 
needs.  
A recent report published by DHS, “Fire Service Integration for Fusion 
Centers” (April 2010), explains how intelligence and information are now 
important elements to support fire service preparedness for response and 
recovery missions (Security, 2010). To take advantage of intelligence products 
for planning and operations, first responders also need to understand clearly 
what intelligence can actually do for them. The Intelligence Guide for First 
Responders lists some valuable uses for intelligence. 
• Provide decision advantage, by improving the decision-making of 
consumers 
• Warnings of potential threats 
• Insight into key current events 
• Situational awareness 
• Long-term strategic assessments on issues of ongoing interest 
• Reports on specific topics, either as part of ongoing reporting or 
upon request for short-term needs (ITACG, 2009). 
While the above points illustrate the value of intelligence, first responders should 
also have realistic expectations; intelligence can assist with preparing and 
responding but cannot predict nor prevent everything that may be confronted. 
Intelligence can also provide a mitigation function for first responders. 
Mitigation is typically the process of reducing or eliminating risks. Intelligence-led 
policing, which originated in the United Kingdom during the 1990s, has been 
suggested as the model for what is termed intelligence-led mitigation. In a recent 
white paper (February 2010) Townsend, Sullivan, Monahan, and Donnelly 
present a case that intelligence-led policing and intelligence-led mitigation use 
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the intelligence cycle as a basic tenet. The authors cite the New Jersey State 
Police Practical Guide to Intelligence–Led Policing, which states that the 
intelligence cycle “seeks to set appropriate tasking priorities for the colllection of 
basic data, process that data into an easy useable format, analyze it to create 
situational awareness through intelligence products that support tactical, 
operational and strategic needs, then disseminate those products to customers 
who provide feedback on what additional or new intelligence requirements 
remain. The cycle begins anew as new requirements are again balanced against 
command guidance, operational needs, and resource constraints” (Townsend, 
Sullivan, Monahan, & Donnelly, 2010). Their claim is that intelligence-led 
mitigation uses the same cycle but provides products and support to a larger 
group of stakeholders, which includes all public safety and emergency services 
entities.  
C. MECHANISMS FOR DISSEMINATING INFORMATION AND 
INTELLIGENCE  
In order for the information sharing process to be meaningful, a mutual 
understanding must exist between the intelligence/law enforcement communities 
and the fire service that there is value added in this relationship, which is 
evolving because of the work being done through numerous federal, state, and 
local efforts. The IC is also being encouraged to change its way of thinking as it 
relates to information sharing. Lee Hamilton, former Vice Chair of the 9/11 
Commission stated, “we have made minimal progress toward the establishment 
of a seamless information sharing system. You can change the law, you can 
change the technology, but you still need to change the culture; you need to 
motivate the institutions and individuals to share information” (CRS Report, 
2006). The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required 
that the president establish an Information Sharing Environment (ISE) “for the 
sharing of terrorism information in a manner consistent with national security and 
applicable legal standards relating to privacy and civil liberties.” The ISE mainly 
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focuses on how to coordinate access to and the sharing of protected terrorism 
information (Program Manager, 2006). In December 2005, President Bush 
issued a presidential memorandum titled “Guidelines and Requirements in 
Support of the Information Sharing Environment.” In the memorandum, he clearly 
defines the guidelines for information sharing to be used at all levels of 
government. 
The fire service in the United States may not have to start from scratch 
when trying to determine how to disseminate intelligence to field forces. In his 
thesis for the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Bryan Heirston describes how 
the United Kingdom’s Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 included a significant role 
for the fire service in the intelligence cycle, specifically related to information 
sharing to prevent terrorism. 
One of the primary concerns about sharing information, as noted by 
Heirston, pertains to the sharing of sensitive information. Sometimes, intelligence 
contains information that can compromise sources or ongoing investigations. The 
United Kingdom model of sharing sensitive information uses fire liaisons 
(battalion level chiefs in the United States), and executive-level officers (deputy 
or staff chiefs in the United States). The fire liaisons have advanced security 
clearances and have direct contact with the intelligence community to receive 
intelligence. If sensitive information is contained in the intelligence product, the 
liaisons have the training to be able to share the relevant information with the 
field forces without compromising the sensitive/classified nature of the 
information (Heirston, 2009, p. 63).  
As of 2010, 72 DHS designated state and major urban fusion centers 
operated throughout the United States, with many additional local and regional 
fusion centers also operating throughout the country. Their existence is a 
testament to the fact that homeland security leaders have recognized the value 
of centralizing intelligence gathering and analysis to assist in preventing and 
responding to terrorist threats (CRS Report, 2006). The fire service integration 
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into state and major urban area fusion centers is showing some promise. The 
latest report (October 2009) released by the DHS, regarding the status of fire 
service integration within state and major urban area fusion centers, shows that 
48 of the 72 established fusion centers (67%) are performing outreach to state 
and local fire service organizations and/or looking at options for integration in the 
future (DHS Report, 2009). 
D. INFORMATION/INTELLIGENCE CLASSIFICATION BARRIERS 
In order for fire service personnel to integrate fully into the intelligence 
process and be able to disseminate information, the literature indicates that the 
issue of security clearances must be addressed. What constitutes “classified” 
information? Can Unclassified/For Official Use Only (U/FOUO) information be 
vetted to extract what is needed by fire service personnel to protect its members? 
Information labeled law enforcement sensitive (LES) is generally considered not 
consumable by other than law enforcement personnel. How can that information-
sharing barrier be overcome?  
Presidential Executive Order 13356 of August 2004, Strengthening the 
Sharing of Terrorism Information to Protect Americans, requires that records and 
reports related to terrorism information be made available at an unclassified level 
as much as possible to allow personnel with the appropriate training, access for 
sharing with their agencies (Executive Order 13356, 2004).  
In his 2002 article, “Bridging the Intelligence Gap,” David J. Rothkopf 
acknowledges that the culture of secrecy in the intelligence community has 
slowed its growth and caused distrust to develop between the IC and the newly 
recognized collectors and consumers at the state and local level. He brings 
attention to the importance of meeting the new challenge of collaboration among 




An interesting perspective to the security clearance issue is highlighted in 
a special report by the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland 
Security, which includes a recommendation by the Heritage Foundation for the 
federal government to declassify as much information as possible instead of 
requiring security clearances for intelligence consumers. This recommendation 
asserts that the cost of obtaining security clearances is an undue burden for state 
and local entities when they are trying to assist the federal government in 
protecting the nation (House of Representatives Report, 2005, p. 17). 
E. THE ROLE OF TRAINING PROGRAMS 
Training fire service personnel in the intelligence discipline helps to 
formalize the relationship with IC members and other homeland security 
partners. Programs already exist in Colorado, Arizona, and Indiana, among 
others that can be used as models for training program development. For 
example, the Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) program in Arizona incorporates 
fire service personnel and includes a state certified 40-hour training program and 
a security clearance to have full access to intelligence products produced at the 
state fusion center (Salyers & Lutrick, 2007).  
The Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Fusion Center 
Guidelines, Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New World, 
offers in guideline #13 recommendations for multidisciplinary awareness and 
education. The guideline specifically states, “provide a multi-tiered awareness 
and educational program to implement intelligence-led policing and the 
development of sharing of information” (Global Justice, 2005, p. 67). The key 
point made is to include non-traditional partners in intelligence, which includes 
the fire service. 
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
As illustrated in the literature review, very little documented evidence 
exists of how the fire service is participating in the intelligence sharing business 
to date. The establishment of the FSIE has increased the awareness of the IC, 
law enforcement, and fire service of the need to continue developing this new 
partnership but more needs to be done. There are approximately 33,000 fire 
service agencies in the United States. Only 15 agencies initially participated in 
the FSIE. This low number indicates that the fire service has much work to do if it 
is going to increase its ability to assist in the prevention of terrorist acts, as well 
as provide enhanced safety to its members while performing their routine daily 
duties or when responding to major disasters resulting from a natural calamity or 
that may have a nexus to terrorism. This thesis evaluates methods used to 
overcome the challenges of information and intelligence sharing to develop 
recommendations for better dissemination mechanisms that fire service agencies 
can use to improve relationships with the intelligence/law enforcement 
communities. 
How can information and intelligence be better disseminated to local first 
responders to enhance situational awareness, provide a higher degree of 
responder safety, and better protect the public? To answer the research 
question, several steps were taken to gather information for analysis. 
A combination of methods was used to gather and analyze information. 
First, structured interviews were conducted with subject matter experts from the 
fire service and homeland security disciplines to determine what methods already 
exist for disseminating intelligence and information to first responders. The 
interviews were conducted by telephone. Second, a six-question survey was 
developed using an online service and was distributed to 40 first responder fire 
chiefs, including career and volunteer fire service agencies. (See Appendices A 
and B for a list of the interview and survey questions used for the research). The 
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survey was conducted to solicit information from field responders on what type of 
intelligence would be most helpful to them in the field, and how they would like to 
receive the intelligence, to enhance safety before, during and after a response to 
a significant event. The survey was designed and conducted using methods 
described in Survey Research Methods (Third Edition, 2001) by Floyd J. Fowler 
Jr. The survey questions were presented in an open-ended format to allow 
respondents to answer without limits or restrictions. The answers were analyzed 
and the results summarized as illustrated in Figures 2 through 7 in the analysis 
chapter. Knowing what field responders want and/or need can assist in 
developing the best tools needed to disseminate the information.  
In addition to conducting the interviews and survey, additional information 
was gathered by researching fire service agency and DHS websites, and fire 
service trade magazines for technological initiatives that have been researched 
and developed for assisting with the dissemination of intelligence and 
information. The intent of the additional research was to gather additional data to 
support recommendations on how to disseminate intelligence and information 
efficiently to field responders to enhance their decision-making before, during, 
and after an incident.  
Eighteen people were interviewed for this thesis. Interview subjects were 
chosen for their involvement in the FSIE initiative, their work within the DHS 
Intelligence Enterprise. Others were selected to obtain a law enforcement 
perspective on intelligence and information sharing.  
Nine fire service representatives were interviewed. Of the nine, six 
represented fire departments that were original participants in the FSIE initiative; 
two were fire service representatives currently working with the National 
Counterterrorism Center’s Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination 
Group (ITACG), and one was the director of a large urban Fire Department 
Operations Center. The remaining interview subjects were representatives from 
DHS, including the United States Fire Administration, the Office of Intelligence 
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and Analysis State and Local Program Office, the Emergency Services Sector of 
the Infrastructure Protection Office, two law enforcement officials with intelligence 
backgrounds, and two fire service graduates of NPS. The assumption was that 
the subject matter expertise of all the interview subjects provided for a valuable 
comparative analysis.  
After all data were collected, a qualitative analysis was conducted to 
understand what is being done in different agencies to identify best practices in 
the dissemination of intelligence down to the local level. Best practices are 
identified on the FEMA website, Lessons Learned Information Sharing 
(www.llis.gov), as exemplary, peer-validated techniques, procedures, good ideas, 








A. STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
Interview subjects were asked a series of open-ended questions to 
determine what is currently being done within their organizations regarding the 
identification of and the use of intelligence, as well as how and if they prepare 
their personnel for this new role. Once the interviews were completed, a 
qualitative analysis was performed using a manual data coding process to 
identify the key themes from the interviews and provide a detailed narrative 
related to the interview questions. 
1. Responses and Analysis to Question 1 
• What is the role of intelligence within your organization? 
The overarching answer to this question was that intelligence is used to 
provide situational awareness for first responders. What actually is situational 
awareness? Situational awareness was most commonly defined as knowing 
what is going on around you. Most fire department training programs often 
incorporate references to situational awareness. This phrase has become one of 
the new buzzwords in the fire service. Firefighters and other first responders are 
constantly reminded to know where they are, observe what is going on around 
them and to be diligent in reporting anything unusual. In the context of firefighting 
and emergency operations, it is a matter of life and death. When a firefighter is 
crawling around a building that is on fire, they must rely on their training and 
experience to perform their assigned tasks safely. In addition, they must perform 
an adequate size-up while responding to an incident, when they arrive at an 
incident and throughout the incident until the incident is deemed to be under 
control. They must anticipate what may happen next. A difference exists between 
static situational awareness and dynamic situational awareness. Static situational 
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awareness means an assessment at a particular moment in time of an incident. 
Dynamic situational awareness is an evolution of scene size-up. It not only 
involves understanding the current situation, it allows a responder to anticipate 
how the situation might change and to be able to react to the changing 
environment (Townsend, Sullivan, Monahan, & Donnelly, 2010, p. 5). 
Understanding dynamic situational awareness is the framework for a better-
informed decision-making process at an incident. One of the interview subjects 
defined intelligence as “information that is relevant to your decision making 
process” (T. Herlocker, personal communication, April 28, 2010).  
Another factor that is a consideration regarding the role of intelligence is 
how intelligence products are used. Interview subjects indicated that the 
intelligence products could be used in three ways.  
• They can be used to discuss emerging trends to develop training 
programs to increase the awareness of responders.  
• In real time, as an incident is evolving, intelligence can be used to 
make deployment decisions. As an example, one interview subject 
reported that if his organization receives intelligence that identifies 
a credible threat to first responders, it might direct its field 
personnel to enhance security on fire apparatus and in fire 
department facilities. Another example provided speaks to the 
importance of cooperation between law enforcement and the fire 
service. If a fire department were responding to a house fire that 
local law enforcement knew was under surveillance for suspicion of 
containing bomb-making materials, it would be critical for that to be 
communicated to the responding units. Prior to the incident, that 
information may not have to be given to the firefighters or fire 
officers in a local station, but it probably should be given to the 
individuals responsible for making the strategic and tactical 
decisions in the event of a response to that location. It would be 
their decision on how to make the local firefighters and fire officers 
aware.  
• Intelligence is utilized to analyze threat assessments to facilitate the 
strategic planning processes. For example, if threat assessments 
indicated that improvised explosive devices (IED) in combination 
with radiological materials are a concern, a priority in planning may 
be to invest money in purchasing detection equipment and 
developing training programs to educate and protect first 
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responders on this particular hazard. During the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) conference in Seattle in 1999, the role of 
intelligence was to inform local first responders of what groups 
might be coming into their jurisdiction to be able to understand the 
threat element, what kind of tactics and techniques they used, and 
what potentially could be the effect on local first responders. “If 
there were anarchists who would blow things up or set fires, the fire 
department would want to know” (M. Washington, personal 
communication, June 14, 2010). 
2. Responses and Analysis to Question 2 
• What effect has the FSIE had on intelligence and information 
sharing for the fire service? 
The FSIE has been a DHS management initiative to reach out to subject 
matter experts within the fire service to discuss the fire service information and 
intelligence sharing issue. The intent was to get buy-in from the fire service in 
understanding the benefits of intelligence and information sharing for their 
stakeholders. Representatives interviewed for this thesis claimed that the FSIE 
put the fire service “on the map recognizing that we need to be a player in the 
intelligence world” (T. Herlocker, personal communication, April 28, 2010). It has 
recently been described as “more of an ad-hoc group that gets together and 
discusses specific issues” (personal communication, June 14, 2010). A new 
focus has been to change the face of the FSIE by removing the word 
“intelligence” from the initiative and using “fire service information sharing” as the 
public face for the effort.  
The FSIE has been the catalyst for getting the fire service involved in the 
intelligence business. One interview subject believes that a key aspect of the 
FSIE is to enable the sharing of best practices among and between fire service 
organizations. Another interview subject stated that he was not sure that there 
actually has been a one to one relationship between the FSIE and the actual 
sharing of information and intelligence. He feels that other initiatives happened 
parallel to its formation, in particular, the development of fusion centers. The 
22 
 
recently published appendix to the Baselines Capabilities for State and Major 
Urban Area Fusion Centers, Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers, is a key 
doctrinal piece to continue the development of the fire service information sharing 
initiative. However, as stated by one interview subject, “it is a good start, but the 
proof will be when and if we actually get fire service representatives into the 
fusion centers” (M. Washington, personal communication, June 14, 2010). At 
present, fire service representation in fusion centers is on a broad spectrum, 
ranging from no representation to very intricate relationships. In Arizona, fire and 
police are tightly woven in the Arizona Counterterrorism Intelligence Center 
(ACTIC). In another large U.S. city, the fire service representative is not even 
allowed inside the fusion center, he may get a phone call or an e-mail with 
information, if he is lucky.  
To demonstrate how the FSIE has highlighted the importance of fire 
service participation in fusion centers, one of the interview subjects cited 
attendance at some of the recent fusion center conferences. At the very first 
conference, 25 fire service personnel attended out of 900 attendees. The 
following year, roughly 100 fire service personnel attended. At the most recent 
conference, approximately 200 fire service personnel attended (R. Palestrant, 
personal communication, April 29, 2010).  
3. Responses and Analysis to Question 3 
• Does your agency have trained Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLO)? If 
so, how and where do they receive their training? What are their 
duties and how do they interact with field responders? 
Only a few of the organizations represented by the interview subjects have 
TLO. All acknowledged that the program could benefit the intelligence and 
information sharing process but also commented, “one size does not fit all.” The 
general consensus was that if a TLO program were to be adopted, it should be 
customized to the needs of the jurisdiction and that it also be dependent on the 
existing relationship with the law enforcement community.  
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What is a TLO? It is an individual trained in handling and processing 
intelligence documents and information. Different models of TLO programs exist 
as described by the interview subjects. Some of the organizations represented 
have several TLO while others that also have them only have one. Other 
organizations used other personnel as “TLO” without the particular title. In fact, 
some even suggested that a different name be utilized for the job duties to reflect 
the all-hazards nature of fire service work more accurately. Other suggested titles 
were Fusion Liaison Officer or Field Intelligence Officer.  
Representatives from the organizations that do have TLO indicated that 
the duties and responsibilities, as well as the training, varied. One west coast 
department has essentially one TLO who represents fire departments in fifteen 
separate counties. He describes himself as more of a facilitator for disseminating 
information. He has built a core network of fire chiefs who receive information 
from him but, according to him, they may or may not disseminate the information 
any further. The network he developed enables him to offer TLO training in 
several formats. His state has a state certified TLO program, which is eight 
hours, or one day of training. This is considered an introductory program. There 
is a three-day intermediate program (twenty-four hours) and an advanced (forty-
hour) program. He also provides what he describes as a mini-TLO program; a 
three hour presentation tailored for the line firefighter and fire officer, essentially 
an awareness level program on terrorism, which covers indicators and warnings, 
legalities, how to report suspicious activity, and a familiarization with the regional 
fusion center; what it is and how to contact them. His biggest challenge is 
marketing the value of these programs and getting the buy-in from the fire chiefs 






Another fire chief interviewed, from a major city on the east coast, claimed 
he uses a hybrid TLO program. They have one trained TLO on duty, their special 
operations chief who is the first point of contact for reporting suspicious activity, 
and is the liaison with other agencies in the city. His suggestion is that if a 
jurisdiction were to endorse and adopt a TLO program, it needs to be built for the 
environment that it is in (J. Donnelly, personal communication, April 26, 2010).  
In a large southeast city, the fire department representative uses what he 
describes as administrative TLO’s. They use a tiered approach to delivering TLO 
training, and they first trained all of their civilian employees with a TLO 
awareness program. This included administrative employees, fire inspectors and 
facilities personnel. The intent was to enable them to recognize and be able to 
report suspicious activity. He highlighted that this training was done at no cost to 
the organization because it was done while the employees were working and 
required no expense to backfill their positions. His hope is to acquire funding in 
the future to train the “boots on the ground” battalion chiefs, fire officers, and 
firefighters in a minimum eight-hour program, with a goal of eventually 
developing a thirty-two to forty-hour program. Currently, he has administrative 
TLO’s working in the regional fusion centers that have developed an excellent 
working relationship with fusion center personnel. With the additional training to 
field personnel, his vision is to expand the TLO program to have both 
administrative TLO’s and on-scene response TLO’s (R. Palestrant, personal 
communication, April 29, 2010).  
All of the fire service representatives interviewed emphasized one TLO 
model that, in their views, represented what some of them termed as the 
“Cadillac” model for TLO programs. This program is in the state of Arizona in the 
Phoenix metropolitan area. The representative from this program provided a 
comprehensive description of their program. The TLO program in this region is a 
forty-hour DHS approved program, which allows them to compete for grants to 
fund the program. It is also approved by the state of Arizona, which enables law 
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enforcement personnel to obtain continuing education credit hours for 
completion. The backbone of the program is about intelligence and information 
sharing; however, the curriculum is specific for their jurisdiction. The unique 
component of the Arizona program is that most of the value comes from the 
focus on the response mission. Response TLO’s actually become the 
Intelligence Section within the Incident Command System (ICS) and respond with 
a laptop computer, and are able to share relevant information from the Arizona 
Counterterrorism Intelligence Center ACTIC with the incident commander. 
Literally, they are able to show the incident commander (IC) what they can bring 
to the table relative to intelligence, whether it is criminal in nature, a person or 
location that might pose a threat to firefighters; or something about the structure 
they are operating in that poses a threat. An extremely important aspect of this 
program is that no difference exists between a police department intelligence 
officer and a fire department intelligence officer other than one carrying a gun 
and the other a hose. In fact, the TLO’s in this region are actually referred to as 
“guns and hoses.” The fire TLO has the clearance and capability to obtain 
criminal intelligence if needed and pass it on to the IC. As an example, if the fire 
department were to make entry into a building after it was deemed safe by the 
police resources on scene, and there was a need for them to recognize a 
perpetrator, the TLO has the capability to receive a photograph of the person and 
brief the firefighters on the scene before making entry. Another example of the 
excellent working relationship that exists is regarding SWAT team operations. 
When the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team is being deployed to a 
location, the fire department TLO is notified and responds. Fire department 
emergency medical units are staged in the area in the event a police officer is 
injured, for a quick deployment. In addition, the TLO is able to advise the 
dispatch center that police department activity is occurring in the area so that 
units that might be responding to other alarms in the area are aware. The TLO 
gives clearance to those units when it is safe to respond. This also prevents the 
other responding units from warning the perpetrators prior to the police 
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department deploying their personnel. The TLO advises them to respond without 
lights and sirens when entering the area (R. Salyers, personal communication, 
June 14, 2010). 
4. Responses and Analysis to Question 4 
• How does your agency disseminate intelligence? 
This question also presented a variety of responses. The most frequent 
responses were that the represented organizations prepared and disseminated 
weekly bulletins. One department disseminates a daily bulletin to all staff level 
chiefs.2 Some departments circulate information only as needed or depending on 
if specific intelligence requires action for dissemination.  
The representative from a mid-west department that disseminates a daily 
bulletin explained that the staff level chiefs receive it, and only if something is 
applicable to a local area or specific unit, is it disseminated. If that becomes the 
case, it requires approval from a deputy commissioner or a staff chief. It was 
interesting to note that he mentioned that the police department shares 
information with local emergency medical response (EMS) units regarding gang 
activity. They do this through the local district fire battalion chiefs and not through 
fire department headquarters. Other information disseminated is mined from 
special reports from DHS. No analysis is provided; just raw information, which is 
usually sent to special operations units or bureaus, such as the fire marshals or 




                                            
2 Staff level chiefs are usually the senior management of a department. An example would be 




Those departments that published weekly documents claim that a daily 
brief may tend to desensitize the average first responder and they may not read it 
regularly. The consensus was that a weekly document provides a reasonable 
frequency that can provide the necessary information, such as significant events 
that can affect fire department activities. Most of those producing a weekly 
bulletin include local, national, and international information. 
One department provides a weekly Monday morning brief via an e-mail to 
a secure folder on the fire department Intranet, which is a read only document 
that cannot be copied or printed. Fire department units are required to use the 
information from the brief for drill purposes for the succeeding four days to cover 
all shifts of personnel. In addition, a weekly conference call briefing is conducted 
on Monday mornings with the special operations units (J. Donnelly, personal 
communication, April 26, 2010).  
The New York Fire Department (FDNY) produces a weekly bulletin called 
Watchline, which is department-wide and addresses all-hazard FDNY specific 
mitigation and response missions “to keep members abreast of new dangers and 
guard against complacency in the absence of new incidents” (FDNY, 2007). 
Watchline is the specific mechanism for disseminating all hazards information to 
the field. It is circulated via e-mail to all units through their e-mail accounts. The 
bulletin contains relevant and current unclassified information with 
recommendations to review specific department publications and training 
bulletins depending on the events described. Watchline is categorized as 
Unclassified/For Official Use Only (U/FOUO). No requirement exists to use the 
information contained in Watchline for drill purposes. It is available to chiefs and 
officers if they choose to do so. 
The Seattle Fire Department has no formal product within for 
disseminating intelligence. If a threat exists, an informal method is used. As an 
example, if a dangerous situation occurs relating to a particular building, such as 
a structural problem, the local responding stations are notified via internal 
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communications. Regarding a terrorist threat, the local battalion is briefed by 
senior staff and sometimes invited to a Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) 
meeting to receive unclassified information that can be shared with responding 
units (M. Washington, personal communication, June 14, 2010). 
One other department utilizes conference calls with their on duty chiefs to 
disseminate intelligence that is time sensitive for them to be able to advise their 
responding units. The information is carefully vetted to provide only what they 
need to know to keep their members safe (J. Donnelly, personal communication, 
April 26, 2010). 
5. Responses and Analysis to Question 5 
• Are you aware of any models, other than your own agency, for 
intelligence sharing and dissemination currently being used in the 
fire service that have been successful? 
Most of the interview subjects again mentioned the Arizona program but 
other examples were highlighted as well for specific parts of their programs. 
FDNY representatives discussed the state of New Jersey fusion center, the 
Regional Operations Intelligence Center (ROIC), as a good example for 
disseminating intelligence because it provides an all hazards approach and not 
an all crimes approach to producing and sharing intelligence (personal 
communication, April 28, 2010). The fusion center in the National Capital Region 
(Washington, D.C.) uses a model where distribution is to a single point of contact 
within each of the participating fire service agencies. Each agency has a 
designated point of contact responsible for making the information pertinent to 
their agency and disseminating it according to their protocol. Their regional fire 
intelligence group is encouraging fire departments to push the information into 
secure folders on their Intranets accessible to all personnel in the agency, mostly 
FOUO information. If the information is of higher classification, then conference 
calls are conducted with the intelligence-working group with those possessing the 
security clearances. The next evolution in the National Capital Region is to avoid 
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individual internal dissemination and instead have the fusion center push the 
information into the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) and have the 
approved personnel establish HSIN accounts. The intent is to warehouse the 
data in one central location for access. The process for obtaining HSIN accounts 
is not very complicated as long as the agency sponsors its personnel. In this 
system, an added benefit is that when something of interest is posted, all 
participating partners receive an e-mail. The only concern with this type of 
mechanism is the issue of being comfortable with the federal government 
becoming the main point of distribution (J. Donnelly, personal communication, 
April 26, 2010). 
6. Responses and Analysis to Question 6 
• Does your agency have a representative in the local/regional fusion 
center? If not from your agency, is there a fire service 
representative? Is that person well received and a respected 
partner? 
Of the fire service representatives interviewed, only three had 
representatives in the fusion centers. Washington, DC Fire/Rescue has a fire 
service analyst in the fusion center funded through a grant. Their representative 
is very well received and was described as “an integral part of the fusion center.” 
They also have a fire lieutenant with intelligence responsibilities who has full 
access to the fusion center (J. Donnelly, personal communication, April 26, 
2010).  
A different model exists in Miami-Dade Fire/Rescue. Three people from 
their Terrorism Response Bureau are assigned to the fusion center, who are 
members on light duty assignment and have been very well received by their 
counterparts in law enforcement. This relationship is two years old and continues 
to evolve. Their fusion center is divided into sectors representing some of the 
critical infrastructure sectors, such as transportation, public health, 
chemical/biological, banking/finance, and energy. They also have a sector for 
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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Analysts are assigned to each sector, and 
the three fire department representatives are assigned between one and three 
sectors as areas of responsibility. One of the unique features about 
Miami/Dade’s regional fusion center is that the law enforcement and fire 
representatives assigned not only work together in the fusion center but they also 
interact out in the field by making visits and establishing relationships with 
representatives working in the various sectors. This allows them to better 
understand what the issues are from a security standpoint in each sector (R. 
Palestrant, personal communication, April 29, 2010).  
The Phoenix metropolitan area also has fire service representatives in the 
fusion center, which is a well-developed relationship through the TLO training 
program that they provide. 
Seventy-two fusion centers are up and running throughout the United 
States. Their existence is a testament to the fact that homeland security leaders 
have recognized the value of centralizing intelligence gathering and analysis to 
assist in preventing and responding to terrorist threats (CRS Report, 2006). 
Having trained people integrated into a fusion center provides a greater 
opportunity for this information exchange to occur in a timely manner. The fire 
service integration into state and major urban area fusion centers is showing 
some promise. The latest report (October 2009) released by the DHS I&A, 
regarding the status of fire service integration within state and major urban area 
fusion centers, shows that 48 of the 72 established fusion centers (67%) are 
performing outreach to state and local fire service organizations and/or looking at 





7. Responses and Analysis to Question 7 
• Does your local fusion center produce intelligence that is valuable 
for the fire service? 
Most of the interview subjects could not answer this question in the 
affirmative. What they did state was that most of the products produced are law 
enforcement centric. One interview subject made a key point regarding the ability 
of a fusion center to produce a product relevant for the fire service, “it cannot be 
done in a vacuum. The fusion center acts on the intelligence requirements that 
we provide them” (J. Donnelly, personal communication, April 26, 2010). The 
FSIE working group has reportedly developed a currently unapproved list of 
national fire service requirements. The goal is to be able to give the requirements 
to the state and major urban area fusion centers so that analysts are aware of 
the fire service’s needs (J. Dennis, personal communication, April 2, 2010). 
8. Responses and Analysis to Question 8 
• What type of intelligence should be shared with first responders? 
The answer to this question ranged from anything that can influence 
tactical decision making to enhance safety to as narrow as only terrorism-related 
information. The sense was that it depended on if those interviewed believed in 
an all-hazards or a terrorism-only approach to intelligence and information 
sharing. What was evident was that whatever was shared and disseminated 
would drive training and preparedness efforts. 
9. Responses and Analysis to Question 9 
• What would your recommendation be for an effective model for 
disseminating intelligence to field responders in a fire department? 
The consensus was that the model should be discipline specific, in other 
words, tailored to the requirements of the discipline. Fire service requirements 
are very different from law enforcement requirements. We need to know what 
and where. Law enforcement needs to know who. Another suggestion was that 
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the model be layered depending on the size of the organization. In larger 
departments, the model using secure folders on an Intranet could provide 
security and also allow wide access within the agency. In a smaller department, 
personal communication from the hierarchy might be more timely and efficient. 
One key issue raised was the need to establish controls on the members of the 
respective departments to maintain security and sustain a good intelligence and 
information flow.  
10. Responses and Analysis to Question 10 
• What is your opinion on the issue of security clearances for 
members of the fire service with intelligence responsibilities? Are 
security clearances necessary? 
The responses to this question were varied. Most thought that clearances 
were necessary for those individuals who work in the fusion centers or for those 
who attend regular briefings that contain intelligence that may be marked secret 
or top secret. Clearances are not necessary to have access to LES or FOUO 
intelligence. The consensus was that field responders did not require clearances; 
most of what they would receive or have access to generally becomes open 
source. 
One interview subject commented that clearances do not necessarily 
facilitate inclusion in meetings but are used “as a crutch by other agencies to 
keep you out” (J. Donnelly, personal communication, April 26, 2010). Another 
interview subject stated that he has not used his clearance once in two and a half 
years, although now that he is working with the local Joint Terrorism Task Force 
(JTTF), he will probably have more use for it. He also stated that in his 
experience, the longer that he has worked face to face with law enforcement and 
the more their working relationship has developed, a sense of trust has been 
developed, which can enhance information sharing (S. Francisco, personal 
communication, April 17, 2010). 
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The most frequent comment to this question was the sense of frustration 
in the length of time it requires to obtain a security clearance, from either DHS or 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 
11. Responses and Analysis to Question 11 
• What is the range of classifications or sensitive markings for the 
intelligence products you receive? 
The majority of the responses cited FOUO and LES. Some responses 
stated secret, and top secret but they were qualified by explaining that most of 
what the fire service needs is not at this level; however, there is value in some 
people possessing these clearances who have the ability to sanitize the 
intelligence to make it actionable.  
12. Responses and Analysis to Question 12 
• Are you aware of any specific programs to train fire service 
personnel in the intelligence process? 
Currently, no fire service centric training programs exist to train fire service 
personnel in the collection of or the use of intelligence to enhance their mission 
to prevent, protect, respond and recover from terrorist, accidental, or natural 
disasters. A general consensus by some of the interview subjects indicated that 
most fire service chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive 
(CBRNE) training classes contain terrorism-related information, and if modified to 
include the intelligence cycle and recognition of suspicious activities and how to 
report them, could become somewhat of an intelligence class. Some of the 
federal programs on response to terrorist incidents also could be modified in a 
similar fashion. One interview subject suggested that a definite need existed to 
train fire service personnel on information security and he claimed that it could be 





supervisory levels. He stated that this would be a significant step in being able to 
change this culture as far as information sharing was concerned (J. Donnelly, 
personal communication, April 26, 2010). 
Another interview subject advised that training programs are available 
through the DHS/DOJ Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program and 
Services that, although not specifically for the fire service, acknowledge the fire 
service as a partner with a need for this type of training. As an example, one of 
the programs offered is Fusion Center and Fire Service Information Sharing and 
Coordination. This course as described provides support for jurisdictions as they 
consider coordination with and/or integration of the fire service into existing 
information sharing initiatives and assists fire service personnel to engage in 
existing fusion center information sharing processes (DHS/DOJ Fusion Process 
Brochure, 2008). Another available training opportunity to the fire service is 
through the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Georgia. One 
of the interview subjects suggested that training available at the FLETC would be 
valuable, particularly to train fire service personnel as analysts. His claim was 
that a fire service analyst adds value when interacting with law enforcement 
analysts; they would bring the fire service perspective to the table so that 
relevant products are produced for fire service consumption (R. Palestrant, 
personal communication, April 29, 2010). 
B. SURVEY OF FIRST RESPONDER FIRE CHIEFS 
A six-question survey was developed using an online service and was 
distributed to 40 first responder fire chiefs, including career and volunteer fire 
service agencies. The intent of the survey was to ascertain what their needs 
were regarding the type of intelligence or information they would prefer to 




Of the 40 fire chiefs requested to participate in the survey, 30 completed 
the survey, a 75% response rate (see Figure 1). This response rate is consistent 
with what academic survey organizations are often able to achieve with general 
household surveys (Fowler, 2001, p. 42). 
 
 
Figure 1.   Response Rate for Survey  
1. Response to Survey Question 1 
• Question 1: What type of terrorist related intelligence do you think 
firefighters and EMS personnel need in order to more safely 
perform their jobs? 
As shown in Figure 2, 11 (37%) of the 30 respondents stated they would 
want intelligence that briefs them on current threats and recent events.  
Eight respondents (28%) wanted intelligence regarding what types of 
materials are being used by terrorists. 
Five respondents (17%) wanted to know the modalities and tactics being 
used by terrorists. 




One respondent (1%) wanted information on how to mitigate a current 
threat. 
One respondent (1%) wanted to know the scope of local activity. 
What is evident by the responses to Question 1 is that eighty-three 
percent (83%) of the respondents are interested in receiving intelligence that can 
assist them in preparation activities. Receiving information on specific threats, 
the types of materials used, and the modalities and tactics used, allows 
responders to develop appropriate training programs and purchase equipment 
that enables them to minimize risks to responders and the public.  
 
 
Figure 2.   Responses to Question 1, “What type of terrorism related 
intelligence do you think firefighters and EMS personnel need in 
order to more safely perform their jobs?” 
2. Response to Survey Question 2 
• Question 2: Do you feel that it would be valuable to receive 
intelligence briefings regularly and from whom? 
All of the respondents answered that they would benefit from regular 
intelligence briefings. Regarding from whom they would prefer receiving them, 
they answered as follows. 
37 
 
Seventeen of the respondents (57%) stated they wanted to receive the 
briefings from law enforcement officials. 
Five of the respondents (17%) wanted to receive the briefings from their 
immediate superiors through the chain of command. 
Three of the respondents (10%) wanted to receive the briefings from 
homeland security officials.  
Three of the respondents (10%) wanted to receive the briefings from a fire 
service intelligence representative. 
Two respondents (6%) wanted to receive the briefings from whoever had 
the most reliable and up to date intelligence.  
An interesting result from Question 2 is that the fire chiefs want to receive 
their information from law enforcement officials. This reinforces the need for fire 
service agencies to develop effective information sharing relationships with their 












Figure 3.   Responses to Question 2, “Do you feel that it would be valuable 
to receive intelligence briefings regularly and from whom?” 
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3. Response to Survey Question 3 
• Question 3: How would you prefer to receive intelligence briefings, 
estimates, and assessments? 
Sixteen of the respondents (53%) preferred to receive briefings via e-mail. 
Eleven of the respondents (37%) preferred the briefings to be done at a 
group meeting or conference in person with those providing the briefing. 
Three of the respondents (10%) wanted to receive the briefings in a 
written format, such as a bulletin. 
Many of the interview subjects indicated that they either published or 
received a written document providing intelligence and/or information related to 
terrorism. Question 3 clearly indicates that most of the fire chiefs surveyed (90%) 
would rather have information provided in an e-mail or in person by a subject 
matter expert. A conclusion might be made that if written intelligence products 
were provided to first responders, they needed to be concise, providing 
actionable information that could be quickly digested.  
 
 
Figure 4.   Responses to Question 3, “How would you prefer to receive 
intelligence briefings, estimates, and assessments?” 
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4. Response to Survey Question 4 
• Question 4: What would work best in your agency to disseminate 
intelligence to members in the field? 
The intent of this question was to determine what medium would actually 
be preferred to obtain intelligence down to the line unit level for the fire officers, 
firefighters, and EMS personnel. 
The respondents had several answers to this question. 
Ten (30%) of the respondents indicated that group conferences with chief 
officers would work the best. The chief officers could then disseminate the 
intelligence to the members in their commands personally. 
Five (16%) of the respondents would like daily video conferences to have 
the information disseminated to the fire stations. 
Five (16%) of the respondents wanted to use agency e-mail systems to 
disseminate the intelligence. 
Five (16%) respondents preferred having intelligence sent directly to the 
computers in the fire apparatus and the ambulances in the field. 
Three (10%) of the respondents would like to see a specific software 
program on a fire station computer to obtain the intelligence to the field 
responders. 
Two (6%) respondents felt that it would best to disseminate intelligence in 
a classroom training session style. 
What is important to note with the responses to Question 4 is that 
personal contact is the preferred method. This mechanism works well in the fire 
service at the line level for sharing information because in most fire service 
agencies, the local level fire chief has daily contact with subordinates several 





Figure 5.   Responses to Question 4, “What would work best in your agency 
to disseminate intelligence to members in the field?” 
5. Response to Survey Question 5 
• Would regular intelligence briefings affect your daily operations? 
Twenty-seven (90%) of the indicated that regular briefings would affect 
their daily operation and three (10%) indicated that they would not. 
Although it is clear from the responses to Question 5 that regular briefings 
would affect their daily operations, several of the interview subjects cautioned 
that the briefings needed to be substantive; in other words, contain relevant and 
actionable information. If briefings were conducted just for the sake of conducting 
them, they risked becoming ineffective and could lead to desensitization to the 





Figure 6.   Responses to Question 5, “Would regular intelligence briefings 
affect your daily operations?” 
6. Response to Survey Question 6 
• How many hours of terrorism awareness training does your agency 
provide to personnel? 
The responses to this question resulted in three categories for the number 
of hours that personnel receive terrorism awareness training.  
Thirteen (42%) of the respondents reported that their members receive 
between eight and twelve hours of terrorism awareness training. 
 
Nine (31%) reported that their members receive between one and four 
hours of terrorism awareness training.  
Eight (26%) reported that they provide no terrorism awareness training. 
It was encouraging to note that nearly seventy-five percent (75%) of the 
respondents are providing some level of terrorism awareness training to their 
personnel. Further research is warranted to analyze the curriculum of these 
training programs. The number of respondents not providing any terrorism 
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awareness training is a cause for concern. It is clear that most of the respondents 
consider terrorism awareness training necessary. Including this type of training in 
basic training programs for firefighters and then reinforcing it at supervisory 
levels could be effective in developing an adequate level of preparedness at the 
line level.  
 
 
Figure 7.   Responses to Question 6, “How many hours of terrorism 
awareness training does your agency provide to personnel?” 
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V. BUILDING EXECUTION INTO THE STRATEGY 
The Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise (FSIE) is an initiative to 
incorporate the fire service into national standards, protocols, and mechanisms 
for homeland security information and intelligence sharing. The FSIE is the value 
innovation for the fire service in becoming an important component of the 
intelligence process. Instead of focusing on how to overcome the cultural barriers 
of information sharing between the law enforcement community and the fire 
service, the FSIE makes the competition (law enforcement) irrelevant, 
concentrating on demonstrating the fire service’s value to participation in the 
intelligence process. This is a new and uncontested market space within the 
intelligence community, a Blue Ocean Strategy (Kim, 2005, p. 12). The FSIE 
represents a collaborative effort of several U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) entities; the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, State and Local 
Program Office (I&A/SLPO) and the U.S. Fire Administration, with support from 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Preparedness 
Directorate (FEMA/NPD). The FSIE was created to provide organized federal 
support for incorporating the fire service disciplines in the gathering, analysis, 
and dissemination of homeland security related information and intelligence at 
the federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial levels. The major goal of the FSIE is 
to facilitate fire service integration within state and major Urban Area Fusion 
Centers, and to facilitate the identification and development of information and 
intelligence sharing requirements, mechanisms, and training for fire service 
personnel (FSIE Concept Plan, 2009, p. ii). In essence, the FSIE has become 
what is described by Bryson as the “dominant coalition” or “coalition of the 
willing” to champion the strategy of including the fire service in the intelligence 
process (Bryson, 2004, p. 34). The end result of a successful partnership should 
be enhanced situational awareness for emergency responders, which translates 
into improved safety during preparedness and response activities. The strategy 
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already exists as developed by DHS, the USFA and the creation of the FSIE; the 
mission should now become how to execute the strategy effectively. This chapter 
discusses the methodology for executing the strategy by first discussing how and 
if the FSIE has been successful and then by outlining an execution plan by 
providing a stakeholder analysis to continue building and sustaining the effort. 
A. UNITED STATES FIRE ADMINISTRATION AND THE FSIE INITIATIVE 
The intelligence community and the fire service have recognized that 
improvement is necessary in communications and information sharing (FSIE 
Concept Plan, 2009). This has been a significant step in broadening the role of 
the fire service in the homeland security discipline. Our front line firefighters and 
emergency medical personnel are being recognized as “first preventers” or “first 
responders who are able to recognize telltale signs of danger to homeland 
security and report the suspicious activity and preserve the scene until proper 
authorities arrive” (FDNY, 2007). In his thesis for NPS, Deputy Chief Bryan 
Heirston of the Oklahoma City Fire Department, explains that the FSIE has 
continued to evolve and the draft concept plan (FSIE CONPLAN) was released in 
December 2008. The document, according to Heirston, clarifies “the role of the 
fire service in preventing terrorism through information sharing with local, state, 
and federal homeland security partners and is based on four pillars” (Heirston, 
2009). 
• Identification of the types of intelligence and dissemination 
mechanisms that the fire service needs to enhance all-threat/all-
hazard preparedness and to support fire service response and 
recovery operations. 
• Identification of the way in which the fire service can contribute to 
local and national homeland security all-threat/all-hazard prevention 
and protection efforts. 
• Collaborative development of an information/intelligence-sharing 
network within the fire service, and between the fire service and the 
homeland security/intelligence community, while ensuring the 
protection of citizen privacy and civil rights/civil liberties. 
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• Identification of a pool of fire service subject matter experts to serve 
as advisors for DHS initiatives that involve or affect fire service 
interests (Heirston, 2009). 
The collection of intelligence by the fire service is important to the IC and 
law enforcement to identify any possible nexus to terrorism. It is equally 
important for the IC and law enforcement to have the ability to communicate 
terrorism/criminal related information to the fire service for the protection of their 
personnel. This two-way process is still evolving, as the FSIE becomes more 
mature and develops into a larger community of interest. 
1. Where Does the Fire Service Fit in the Intelligence Cycle? 
The role of the fire service is relevant in every part of the intelligence 
cycle. Intelligence requirements are defined in the planning phase, and then the 
corresponding information needs are identified. Collection is relevant for 
suspicious activity reporting, within the confines of the law, and sharing of 
internal fire department information, such as information obtained from 
performing building inspections or what is observed during the course of normal 
response activities. Analysis occurs when fire service personnel can provide their 
subject matter expertise to intelligence analysts who can then produce more 
relevant intelligence products for fire service personnel to consume. 
Dissemination is relevant because fire service personnel are intelligence 
customers and consumers and may be able to identify other important 
consumers to enhance responder and public safety. Evaluation of intelligence 
products is critical to let analysts know if the fire services’ needs are being met.  
2. Is the FSIE Working? 
The mission statement of the FSIE directly supports an effort to assist first 
responders in maintaining dynamic situational awareness by establishing that its 
main goal is to foster the integration of the fire service into state and major urban 
area fusion centers. The FSIE mission as stated is: 
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Institutionalize the integration of the fire service into Federal, State, 
local, Tribal, and Territorial information and intelligence sharing 
networks—including State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers—
to enhance preparedness and operations of fire service 
organizations across the country, while supporting the prevention, 
protection, response, and recovery efforts of all homeland security 
partners (FSIE Concept Plan 2009, p. 6). 
Seventy-two fusion centers are up and running throughout the United 
States. Their existence is a testament to the fact that homeland security leaders 
have recognized the value of centralizing intelligence gathering and analysis to 
assist in preventing and responding to terrorist threats (CRS Report, 2006). 
Having trained people integrated into a fusion center provides a greater 
opportunity for this information exchange to occur in a timely manner. The fire 
service integration into state and major urban area fusion centers is showing 
some promise. The latest report (October 2009) released by the DHS I&A, 
regarding the status of fire service integration within state and major urban area 
fusion centers, shows that 48 of the 72 established fusion centers (67%) are 
performing outreach to state and local fire service organizations and/or looking at 
options for integration in the future (DHS I&A Report, 2009). The degree of the 
FSIE success is also dependent on the political environment at the federal, state, 
and local levels. The integration process does not necessarily mean that fire 
service personnel have to be physically sitting in the fusion centers, but at a 
minimum, analysts within the fusion centers should have the training to 
accomplish fire service intelligence analysis. The degree of education that the fire 
service, law enforcement, and intelligence communities have received on what 
the objectives of integration are is an important factor. 
In conducting interviews for this thesis, several fire service subject matter 
experts have indicated that the FSIE initiative has lost momentum. The current 
management of this initiative has shifted almost solely to the United States Fire 
Administration, which has resulted in what may be termed a “stovepipe initiative.” 
Prior to this, the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS I&A) had the lead. 
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More emphasis has been placed on building consensus within the fire service. 
The claim is that more of the national fire service organizations, the International 
Association of Firefighters (IAFF), International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), 
and the National Volunteer Fire Council (NVFC), have become involved, each 
bringing their own interests to the process. This has created difficulty for the 
original FSIE participants to build a consensus. The aforementioned 
organizations, IAFF, IAFC, and NVFC, represent 33,000 fire service agencies 
collectively with over 1 million firefighters in the United States. It was indicated 
that the financial aspect of the FSIE, namely the grant process, might be the 
motivation for these other organizations becoming involved. The view of some of 
the interview subjects is that if the FSIE is going to move forward in representing 
the fire service interest in the intelligence business, it must be done in a smaller 
working group. The recommendations in this thesis actually counter that claim by 
citing the momentum that the FSIE has established, and thus, demonstrating an 
impact among the fire service community with regard to improved intelligence 
support. 
3. Has the Intelligence Community Welcomed the Effort?  
One of the main reasons for the FSIE initiative occurred because a 
significant gap existed in the intelligence products needed by the fire service to 
support the decision making process at the strategic and tactical levels. This gap 
exists all across the country and at all levels of government. The National 
Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America (2005) indicates that the IC 
needs to “establish policies that reflect need-to-share (versus need-to-know) for 
all data, removing the “ownership” by agency of intelligence information.” The 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 requires the Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI) to “ensure maximum availability of access to 
intelligence information” (Intelligence Strategy, p. 14). It also recommends 
developing networks capable of distributing intelligence in an unclassified form to 
non-traditional consumers at the state, local, and tribal levels of government. One 
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of the mechanisms established to allow better sharing of terrorism-related 
information is the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group 
(ITACG) within the National Counterterrorism Center. The intent is to assist in the 
production of “federally coordinated” terrorism-related information products for 
dissemination to state, local, and tribal officials (Information Sharing 2007, p. 18). 
Fire service personnel participate and serve on the ITACG.  
In February 2008, the DNI published the United States Intelligence 
Community Information Sharing Strategy, which includes a quote from President 
Bush stating the following: 
I have asked [Director McConnell] to improve information sharing 
within the intelligence community and with officials at all levels of 
our government, so everyone responsible for the security of our 
communities has the intelligence they need to do their jobs. 
(Intelligence Sharing Strategy 2008, p. 3) 
Director McConnell boldly claimed that the IC must transform its culture to 
one where the “responsibility to provide” information is a core mission 
(Intelligence Sharing Strategy 2008, p. 3). It is implied that firefighters and other 
state and local government personnel are not only “first responders” but also the 
first line of defense and an asset to information gathering. In summary, it seems 
as though the IC has welcomed the new challenge of creating a much more 
collaborative information-sharing environment.  
B. STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT 
Considering the FSIE mission a value innovation to establish a strategy for 
better information and intelligence sharing, the fire service could take what Kim 
and Mauborgne call a “reconstructionist” view, and assist in reconstructing the 
boundaries and structure of the current information and intelligence sharing 
“market” (Kim, 2005, p. 17). To be able to accomplish this, careful analysis 




stakeholders in the FSIE initiative. The next section provides a stakeholder 
analysis and highlights the key stakeholders that support the recommendations 
of this thesis. 
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Figure 8.   FSIE Stakeholder Network (From: Fire Service Intelligence 
Enterprise Concept Plan, 2009) 
C. PRIORITIZING THE STAKEHOLDERS 
The stakeholder analysis process is a three-step process. The main 
advantage of the process is to obtain a clearer picture of the players and where 
they actually fit into what can be termed the “stakeholder map.” The first step is 
to identify the stakeholders. The FSIE Concept Plan as depicted in Figure 8 
provides that information. The second step is to determine the needs of the 
stakeholders as they relate to the larger strategy. The interviews and survey for 
this thesis have assisted in accomplishing this step. Once the needs of the 
stakeholders have been identified, the next step is to develop a mechanism for 
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feedback to determine if the selected strategy is working and producing what the 
stakeholders need. The recommendations in Chapter VI of this thesis present a 
framework to develop an evaluation process by providing tools to the 
stakeholders to participate in a meaningful way in the intelligence and information 
sharing process. In addition to the above three steps, it is equally important to 
understand exactly how the stakeholders influence the intelligence and 
information sharing process. If all members of the stakeholder network 
understand the interrelationships of how they can influence the process, it is 
likely that the process will succeed (Kim, 2005, pp. 111–112). 
1. Power/Interest Grid 
According to Kim and Mauborgne, analysis of a stakeholder network using 
a power versus interest grid can assist an organization in plotting the 
stakeholders according to their power within and on an organization in relation to 
their interests to determine how they influence the organization, as well as 
determining what the organization needs from each stakeholder group. It helps in 
identifying the importance of each group to the organization or mission to help 
execute the overall strategy (Kim, 2005). The use of a power versus interest grid 
in the context of this thesis can help to answer the research question, “how can 
information and intelligence be better disseminated to local first responders in 
order to enhance situational awareness, provide a higher degree of responder 
safety, and better protect the public?” According to Bryson, the power versus 
interest grid results in the establishment of four categories of stakeholders. 
Stakeholders with high power and high interest are categorized as players. 
Stakeholders with high power and low interest are categorized as context setters. 
Those with high interest and low power are categorized as subjects; they are 
subject to the power of other stakeholders. The remaining category are those 





(Bryson, 2004, p. 112). Figure 9 shows a model power versus interest grid. It is a 
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Figure 9.   Model Power Versus Interest Grid  
The grid as illustrated by the author identifies the groups whose interest 
and power bases should be considered to execute the overall strategy of 
intelligence and information sharing between the fire service and the law 
enforcement/intelligence community. Two key points can be extrapolated from 
the grid, First, the subject matter experts in the subject quadrant (high 
interest/low power) need to be shifted to the players quadrant (high interest/high 
power). Their continued participation in the FSIE Stakeholder Network can 
facilitate the shift, but to accomplish this, more emphasis must be placed on 
prioritizing the needs of entire fire service. The fire service associations 
participating have the ability to reach out to literally tens of thousands of fire 
service personnel to determine what their issues are concerning intelligence and 
information sharing. These associations cannot operate in a vacuum; they need 
to develop partnerships between themselves, which should result in a greater 
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power base causing a shift from subjects to key players. The second key point 
relates to the “boots on the ground” fire and EMS personnel, who are depicted on 
the grid as part of the crowd and context setters. The average firefighter and 
EMS person probably have little interest in the importance of intelligence and 
information sharing mainly due to a lack of training in this new discipline for the 
fire service. Providing the necessary training to enhance their awareness of how 
important this initiative can be to improve safety and situational awareness, can 
allow a shift to occur whereby firefighters and EMS personnel move on the power 
grid from the crowd and context setters to a more valuable role as subjects 
and players. If the entire fire service can be engaged in understanding the 
critical role that intelligence can play in the course of their duties, particularly 
during and after a significant event, the more likely that the strategy initiated by 
the formation of the FSIE will be executed. Some of the research for this thesis 
indicated that fire service personnel could be trained initially in basic training 
school, as well as including more advanced levels of intelligence training in 
promotional curricula, as people progress in their careers.  
D. BUILDING AND SUSTAINING THE NETWORK 
To build execution into the strategy of developing a meaningful 
intelligence and information sharing environment, buy-in must occur from those 
participating in the process. According to Kim and Mauborgne, it is only when all 
members of an organization are aligned around a strategy and supports it, that 
execution of the strategy can be accomplished. They claim that a culture of trust 
and commitment must be created and that “people’s minds and hearts must align 
with the new strategy so that at the level of the individual, people embrace it of 
their own accord and willingly go beyond compulsory execution to voluntary 
cooperation in carrying it out” (Kim, 2005, p. 171). Using the concept of fair 




1. The Power of Fair Process 
Kim and Mauborgne discovered the concept of fair process by researching 
social science literature. They developed what they term a managerial 
expression of fair process from the concept of procedural justice as described by 
two social scientists, John W. Thibaut and Laurens Walker in the 1970s. Thibaut 
and Walker claimed that people care as much about the justice of the process 
through which an outcome is produced as they do about the outcome itself (Kim, 
2005, p. 175). Kim and Mauborgne assert that fair process builds execution into 
strategy by getting buy-in from people up-front in the process. Fair process 
results in building a sense of trust, which leads to voluntary cooperation (Kim, 
2005). 
Fair process consists of three elements: engagement, explanation, and 
expectation clarity. Engagement is the process of involving people in the 
decisions that affect them and allowing them to have input as the strategy is 
developed. Trust and commitment are outcomes of including the stakeholders 
early and often in the process. Explanation involves ensuring that the 
stakeholders are made aware of why and how decisions are made, which also 
builds trust between the decision makers and the stakeholders. It illustrates that 
all input has not only been solicited, but also utilized in the decision-making 
process. This also allows for feedback and evaluation, which enhances the 
strategic learning process and results in a better product. Expectation clarity 
means that once the strategy is in place, then all stakeholders understand how 
the strategy is implemented and what standards are used to gauge success or 
failure (Kim, 2005).  
An important complementary note to why fair process matters in the 
strategic development process concerns intellectual and emotional recognition 
theory as discussed by Kim and Mauborgne. If people are recognized during the 
process for their intellectual worth, they are more willing to share their knowledge 
and ideas. If they are recognized emotionally, the claim is that they feel 
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emotionally tied to the strategy and aspire to contribute everything they can to 
make it successful. Knowledge and ideas not valued result in people not sharing 
their best critical thinking and creative ideas, which leads to reduced investment 
and counterproductive behavior. 
The author can share a personal example of the power of fair process. In 
1998, the FDNY made a strategic decision to enhance its response capabilities 
to terrorist incidents. Five new response units, called “squad” companies were 
formed and strategically located around the city to decentralize the response to 
hazardous materials and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and 
explosive (CBRNE) incidents. The initiative required the selection of new 
company commanders and unit personnel to staff these units. All new personnel 
would be receiving several hundred hours of training to be able to execute the 
new mission. It required the selection of highly motivated individuals committed 
to success. Personal experience, as one of the new company commanders 
taught the author, that once the personnel were selected, a different style of 
leadership was required to be successful. Early in the process, all new personnel 
in the unit were included and engaged in the decision-making process of how the 
unit would be managed. This was a significant change from the hierarchical 
structure typical in the fire service. The unit personnel developed all internal unit 
policies with final review by the unit leaders. In particular, the senior veterans in 
the unit were given the authority and responsibility to make policy. This process 
resulted in a level of trust and commitment that, until then in the author’s career, 
had not been experienced. Members of the unit made a significant investment 
simply because they were made part of the process. The assignment was one of 
the most rewarding in the author’s career.  
Figure 10 shows the execution consequences of the presence and 






Figure 10.   Execution Consequences of the Presence and Absence of Fair 
Process (From: Kim, 2005, p. 183) 
The inclusion of fair process in the stakeholder analysis helps to build the 
“coalition of the willing” and by developing commitment, trust and voluntary 
cooperation as important capital in moving forward with the fire services’ 
involvement in intelligence and information sharing. As demonstrated by the 
author’s personal example, the level of commitment by fire service personnel can 
be enhanced by those in leadership roles; developing a high level of trust with 
subordinates. This is true for the formal leaders, as well as the informal leaders in 
the rank and file. Thirty years of experience, twenty as a supervisor, enables the 
author to observe that it is noticeable when entering a fire station, if a sense of 
ownership, pride, and commitment exists within a unit. The appearance of the 
unit apparatus, station quarters and the personnel tells a story. This can be seen 
from the new recruit up to and including the senior member of the unit. No matter 
what the mission may be, a unit with those qualities can build and sustain any 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The research for this thesis has shown that an ongoing effort exists within 
the fire service to progress toward full integration in the fusion center process. 
This continues to be a work in progress. While this is a significant step in 
providing the fire service access to homeland security intelligence and 
information, a standardized model for disseminating the intelligence and 
information to the “boots on the ground” first responders is still needed. A 
standardized method of dissemination can be included in intelligence training 
curriculums at all levels. Firefighters are trained to follow standard operating 
procedures beginning in recruit level training, which enables them to make 
decisions more efficiently to accomplish whatever they are tasked with at a fire or 
emergency. As an example, firefighters assigned to perform a search at a 
residential structure fire are taught basic search techniques that allow them to 
move through a structure with speed and efficiency, covering the most area in 
the shortest amount of time possible, minimizing the risk of being in the structure 
for too long and running out of air in their breathing apparatus. If firefighters are 
trained at an early stage and refreshed throughout their careers to receive 
intelligence that can affect theirs and the public’s safety in a standardized format, 
their decision-making capacity is improved, and therefore, the level of risk may 
be reduced. The Times Square car bomb incident in New York City in May 2010 
provides a good example. If a quick and efficient method of dissemination was 
predetermined to notify fire units throughout the city of the incident, once it was 
confirmed, situational awareness would be enhanced for all responders, allowing 
them to use caution and make better decisions, when responding to similar type 
incidents.  
This chapter presents a model for disseminating intelligence and 
information to the fire service. It is multi-phased and allows for modification by 
individual fire service organizations based on their financial and personnel 
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resources. The model is based on the definition of intelligence as all-threat/all-
hazard information that has been gathered and vetted through the intelligence 
cycle to generate products that can be used to guide fire service decisions at the 
strategic, operational, and tactical levels.  
A. A NEW MODEL FOR THE FIRE SERVICE 
The recommendations are based on the October 2009 report of Fire 
Service Integration within State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers by the 
DHS Office of I&A, as a basis for developing the new model. The report provides 
a nationwide picture of fire service involvement in the intelligence- and 
information-sharing evolution through fusion center participation. Three metrics in 
particular influenced the recommendations. 
• Fire service coordination at the state level, a point of contact (POC) 
for coordination between the fusion center and the fire service. Out 
of seventy-two fusion centers, thirty-two reported having this 
capability (44%). 
• Fire Service Fusion, Terrorism, Intelligence Liaison Officers (FLO, 
TLO, ILO) in states or major urban areas with fusion centers. 
Eighteen states out of seventy-two fusion centers reported having 
FLO, TLO, or ILO (23%). 
• Point of contact on the FSIE distribution list. Thirty-eight states 
reported that they had a POC for the FSIE (53%) (DHS I&A Report, 
2009) 
1. Fire Service Coordination at the State Level 
Each of the fifty states has a fire chief’s association whose membership 
consists of the fire chiefs from all areas of the state. Most of the associations also 
have regional and county representatives throughout the state for disseminating 
general fire service information to the fire chiefs in that state, which is a good 
existent network for sharing information. The International Association of Fire 
Chiefs network is divided into eight regional divisions that represent the states in 
the associated divisions. The regional associations are typically the 
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communications link from the IAFC to the state fire chief’s associations. The 
IAFC has a Terrorism and Homeland Security Committee with representatives 
from around the country. The IAFC has been identified as a stakeholder with a 
supporting function by the FSIE. Efforts have begun recently at the executive 
level to develop the relationship further to obtain more involvement from the fire 
service in the information sharing initiative (J. Donnelly, personal communication, 
July 28, 2010). The IAFC could be the main point of contact for the FSIE to 
connect with the states, and in turn, the counties within the states. Each fire 
chief’s association should have a formal point of contact with the FSIE and those 
states with either state or major urban area fusion centers should have the same. 
This is a matter of educating the IAFC leadership and committee leaders on the 
value of the fire service information sharing initiative. The IAFC already has an 
established relationship with the USFA so developing this new initiative should 
not pose a particular problem. The establishment of a secure portal on the IAFC 
website for disseminating unclassified information and/or intelligence would be a 
pragmatic method and would support what interview subjects identified as a key 
way to disseminate intelligence and information. Interview subjects and survey 
respondents identified electronic means of communication as a quick and easy 
method for information sharing. In addition, weekly bulletins were identified as 
the most frequently used mechanism for providing information affecting fire 
department activities. Posting a weekly bulletin in a standardized format, similar 
to the FDNY Watchline, in a secure folder on the IAFC website, can be a logical 
solution and provide a type of “one stop shopping” for relevant intelligence and 
information.  
The IAFC could be the ideal organization to sponsor the Fusion Center 
and Fire Service Information Sharing and Coordination Workshop program 
offered through the DOJ Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program. The 
purpose of this program is to facilitate discussion between fire service personnel 
and their respective fusion centers. It also assists fire service personnel in 
learning how they can engage in the information sharing processes. Participation 
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in this program can begin to assist fire service organizations in improving their 
operational information sharing abilities. The state, regional and/or county fire 
chief’s associations can sponsor these workshops to solicit more participation in 
this important endeavor. Perhaps an alternative to providing fire service 
intelligence training can be for the National Fire Academy (NFA) to offer the 
educational platform and develop a fire service intelligence curriculum. The NFA 
supplies a recognized physical location to conduct the training as well. Having 
both the IAFC and the NFA as training advocates working together can be a 
valuable partnership in this type of initiative. The challenge is to obtain the 
funding to support the program.  
2. FLO, TLO, ILO Training Programs 
A Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) is an individual trained in handling and 
processing intelligence documents and information. When asked if their 
organizations have TLO’s, all of the interview subjects that answered yes 
described them as significant in being able to receive intelligence and information 
that could improve firefighter and public safety. The research indicated that the 
key to developing a successful program was to customize it to fit the jurisdiction it 
served. Having trained TLO’s in a fire department could allow for the following. 
• Any relevant terrorism-related intelligence to be disseminated 
quickly and efficiently.  
• Pertinent intelligence/information from DHS or other federal and 
state resources could be analyzed and provided to members of the 
organization. 
• Threat and vulnerability assessments to be performed.  
• Review of current terrorism-related events in the United States and 
abroad that could have implications in the local jurisdiction. 
• Developing of local area training needs based on risk assessments. 
A program successfully adopted in Arizona can serve as a model for 
developing this area of expertise and training for use throughout the fire service. 
Arizona’s program is a statewide program that incorporates law enforcement, 
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military, federal, and fire service agencies. Fire service personnel can formally 
receive terrorism-awareness and prevention training through this mechanism. 
DHS, through the formation of the FSIE, has already established that firefighters 
and emergency medical workers have access to many buildings and locations 
during the course of their routine duties and are able to notice suspicious activity 
by passively observing their surroundings. The Arizona TLO program provides a 
more advanced level of training than just basic awareness and trains each TLO 
to perform in three mission areas during a forty (40) hour training program. 
• Criminal intelligence collection and dissemination 
• Building intelligence collection (threat and vulnerability 
assessments) 
• On-scene response to significant events 
a. Criminal Intelligence Collection 
The training received in criminal intelligence enables the individual 
to receive, process, and distribute information to appropriate personnel. The 
training program participants all receive an FBI secret clearance after an 
extensive background check to facilitate the performance of their assigned 
duties. In Arizona, a certified TLO, in collaboration with the Arizona 
Counterterrorism Information Center, can reclassify documents for dissemination 
as “public safety sensitive” rather than “law enforcement sensitive,” and thereby, 
increase the number of first responders who can be informed (Salyers, 2007). 
This ability within the fire service can increase the amount of information shared 
to line first responder units when necessary. By decentralizing the consumption 
of information to meet a particular area’s risk profile, first responders may be 
more inclined to react to and implement the recommendations.  
In his thesis, Heirston compares England’s sensitive information-
sharing system with that of the United States. He explains that the fire service 
and intelligence community use a network of what they call fire liaisons (battalion 
chief level in the United States) along with executive-level officers (fire chief and 
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deputy chief level in the United States) who have higher security clearances to 
share sensitive information. The sensitive information can only be seen by the 
members with the advanced clearances who decide on how and what to 
disseminate (Heirston, 2009). A TLO, FLO, or ILO can have this capability if 
necessary. 
b. Building Intelligence 
A designated TLO can identify target hazards, critical infrastructure 
and key assets within their response area for the need to perform threat and 
vulnerability assessments. As an example, the FDNY has a Critical Information 
Dispatch System (CIDS), a computer database that recognizes the unique 
hazards present in certain occupancies.3 Local fire companies generate and 
input the data. This system is successful for two reasons. First, local units usually 
have intimate knowledge of the types of buildings to be assessed and already 
have relationships with building owners, managers, and personnel. Salyers and 
Lutrick indicate that those relationships are important due to the concern by 
building owners that intimate information about their facility be collected and 
used. Second, a TLO can have advanced training in performing threat and 
vulnerability assessments. As force multipliers assisting in assessment 
completion, TLO’s can increase the number of structures and locations to be 
entered into a database and be available at a dispatch or operations center for 
dissemination to the first responders when an incident occurs. A local TLO can 
be the point of contact (POC), and thus, eliminate any confusion in the process.  
                                            
3 Critical Information Dispatch System (CIDS) is a computer database that contains specific 
information on a building or occupancy for the attention of responding units. Tactical information 
that can be helpful to firefighters is included. Most, if not all identified critical infrastructure is 
already in the system. 
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c. On-Scene Response 
Having response TLO’s with specialized training and access to 
specific terrorism-related or all-hazards information puts the information closer to 
what Salyers and Lutrick describe as “boots on the ground” personnel. They 
describe this as closing the loop from collection to dissemination. The FDNY 
already has in place several specially trained chiefs in the field in a variety of 
training disciplines. They have battalion chiefs trained as safety chiefs, 
hazardous materials technicians, foam coordinators, transit liaisons, and air 
reconnaissance chiefs. Depending on the type of incident, a specially trained 
chief is assigned to respond to assist the incident commander in the particular 
specialty. Having fire chiefs trained as TLO’s can enhance capability in a 
terrorism-related event in providing real time information at the command post. 
The TLO can provide human intelligence and interpret the information on scene 
for the incident commander.  
3. Designated Points of Contact for the FSIE 
Ideally, it is beneficial for all U.S. fire service organizations to have a POC 
for the FSIE. As a working group, the FSIE has made progress in developing 
their stakeholder network as evidenced in Figure 8. The interview subjects 
described the FSIE as the catalyst for the fire service involvement in intelligence 
and information sharing. One interview subject noted that a key objective of the 
FSIE should be to facilitate the sharing of best practices for intelligence and 
information sharing between fire service organizations. State fire chiefs 
associations, in collaboration with the FSIE, should advertise the benefits of 
participating as working partners in the initiative to expand the network and to 
continue developing a culture of information sharing. “Fire service organizations 
and personnel should make information sharing an institutionalized part of their 
normal operations” (USFA Fire Service Information Sharing—Message Guide, 
2010). The fire service has been acknowledged as a provider of information to 
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fusion centers, as collaborators by virtue of their training and experience, making 
them important subject matter experts who can greatly contribute to the 
development of intelligence products, and finally, as consumers of information 
and intelligence to assist in preparedness, as well as enhancing responder safety 
during response and recovery operations. Simply having a POC to receive 
relevant information significantly enhances the dissemination of information. The 
fire service represents a community of interest that can both contribute and 
benefit from a wide-reaching information-sharing environment. 
B. TECHNOLOGY AND DISSEMINATING INTELLIGENCE 
The advancements in technology in sending and receiving information are 
constantly evolving. Disseminating intelligence to enhance dynamic situational 
awareness and responder safety should be accomplished in a timely and secure 
fashion. Interview subjects maintained that intelligence products can be used in 
three ways: to discuss trends, make deployment decisions, and analyze threat 
assessments, which are all elements of determining dynamic situational 
awareness to assist first responders in adapting to a changing response 
environment. Receiving the information quickly and securely makes it actionable 
in real time. Currently, some very useful internet-based methods exist for first 
responders to acquire timely and relevant intelligence to assist them in the 
performance of their duties. First responders have the ability to subscribe to 
these sites to receive real time homeland security related information and 
intelligence.  
The Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) is a national secure 
and trusted web-based portal for information sharing and collaboration between 
federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, private sector, and international partners 




The Emergency Management and Response—Information Sharing and 
Analysis Center (EMR-ISAC) is a web-based initiative established to support the 
critical infrastructure protection of emergency services sector departments and 
agencies nationwide.  
Fire service agencies should strive to develop a network command 
capability, which is a new information-sharing framework using voice, video, and 
data to connect first responders for situational awareness and improved incident 
management (Pfeiffer, 2009). 
Finally, fire service agencies need to have an internal mechanism to 
advise field units of situations t occurring in real time while they are on duty. The 
method chosen must be able to communicate with responders in the fire stations, 
as well as in the fire apparatus either while on the road at or while returning from 
an incident.  
1. Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) 
HSIN is comprised of a growing network of communities, called 
Communities of Interest (COI), which are organized by state organizations, 
federal organizations, or mission areas, such as emergency management, law 
enforcement, critical sectors, and intelligence. Users can securely share within 
their communities or reach out to other communities as needed. HSIN provides 
secure, real-time collaboration tools, including a virtual meeting space, instant 
messaging and document sharing. HSIN allows partners to work together 
instantly, regardless of their location, to communicate, collaborate, and 
coordinate (DHS website).  
In addition to the above capabilities, HSIN provides geospatial tool for use 
in establishing enhanced situational and strategic awareness. The Integrated 
Common Analytical Viewer (iCAV) is a secure, web-based, geospatial 
visualization suite of tools that integrates commercial and government-owned 
data and imagery from multiple sources. When the data layers and information 
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feeds are overlaid with imagery, iCAV users are able to view the impact of 
threats, natural and man-made disasters, population centers that can be 
impacted, and the resources available to respond to and recover from an event. 
The iCAV program was initiated as mandated by HSPD-7 to map, image, 
analyze, and sort geospatially the nation's critical infrastructure and key 
resources and is a critical component capability in assisting DHS and its mission 
partners to prepare for, prevent, respond to and recover from natural and man-
made disasters better.4 
HSIN has not been without criticism. A 2007 Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) report suggests that HSIN may not be facilitating effective 
information sharing, and in fact, may be duplicating efforts of state and local 
authorities. The assertion is that HSIN is not providing anything new. The report 
claims it uses similar user groups, such as emergency management agencies, 
and provides similar methods for information sharing, such as electronic bulletin 
boards, “chat” tools, and document libraries. The suggested remedies by the 
GAO are for HSIN to take steps to improve coordination with state and local 
initiatives to reduce redundancy and to use the key initiatives from the state and 
local programs to recommend best practices for more effective coordination and 
collaboration for information sharing at the federal level (GAO, 2007). As a result 
of some of the criticisms, DHS is taking steps to enhance HSIN by developing 
what they are calling HSIN Next Generation (NextGen).5 The current HSIN is a 
                                            
4 Membership in HSIN is COI-based. It is available to fire service members on a subscription 
basis. To become a member, a subscriber must first decide which COI(s) meets their needs. 
Once the COI has been identified, a subscriber needs to be nominated and vetted into the COI. 
Once nominated, the COI Validating Authority reviews the membership application and approves 
or denies admission to the COI. If the application is approved, the subscriber receives an e-mail 
with instructions on how to log onto HSIN for the first time. Fifty three percent (53%) of survey 
respondents for this thesis indicated that they wanted to receive intelligence via electronic means, 
such as e-mail. 
5 The next generation network will provide DHS, its partners and stakeholders information 
management capabilities and services including a portal, search, collaboration, enterprise content 
management, and service oriented architecture-based information integration and analysis 
functions to facilitate collaboration and information sharing needs for sensitive but unclassified 
(SBU) data (Digital Communities 2008, accessed August 1, 2010). 
67 
 
computer-based counterterrorism communications system connecting all 50 
states, five territories, Washington, D.C., and 50 major urban areas. It allows all 
states and major urban areas to collect and disseminate information in real time 
between federal, state, and local agencies involved in combating terrorism. It 
also provides capabilities to help analyze that information. The network also 
gives states and major urban areas real-time interactive connectivity with the 
National Operations Center (NOC). The NOC is the main hub at the federal level 
for providing situational awareness and coordination. It operates twenty-four 
hours a day, seven days a week monitoring threat and hazard information from 
sources all across the country and provides spot reports, and situation reports to 
provide a common operating picture for incident commanders and response 
personnel. Maintaining the NOC capabilities are a high priority as described in 
the National Response Framework (NRF) (NRF, 2008). Participation by first 
responder agencies in HSIN is a valuable tool for disseminating real time 
actionable intelligence and information. 
2. Emergency Management and Response—Information Sharing 
and Analysis Center (EMR-ISAC) 
The goals of the EMR-ISAC are the following. 
• Promote awareness of the threats to and vulnerabilities of 
emergency services sector (ESS) critical infrastructures. 
• Encourage ESS prevention, protection, and resilience actions for all 
disasters. 
• Enhance the survivability, continuity, and “response-ability” in all-
hazards environments (EMR-ISAC Brochure). 
To accomplish its goals, the EMR-ISAC publishes products available to 
subscribers, which provide information relevant to the ESS. CIP (FOUO) notices 
are published periodically and disseminated that contain actionable information 
regarding threats and vulnerabilities potentially affecting emergency plans and 
operations. CIP Infograms are published weekly, which contain information about 
protecting critical infrastructures of emergency responders and their 
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communities. CIP Bulletins, also published as needed, contain homeland security 
information involving infrastructure protection of the emergency services (EMR-
ISAC Brochure) (See appendices for examples).These products are delivered via 
e-mail to subscribers and access to them by first responders can obviously 
contribute to better planning and operational decision making. At a minimum, 
mid-level chief officers and line officers should subscribe. Subscribing requires 
sending an e-mail request to emr-isac@dhs.gov and providing the requested 
information.  
3. Network Command 
The FDNY has been developing a system of network command, which 
includes the use of voice, video and data to enhance situational awareness and 
provides the incident commander with a better decision-making framework. A 
“web-like structure of networks connects to different informational sources to 
enhance command capacity” (Pfeifer, 2009). The network is formed by using 
technology to create enhanced on-scene capabilities for information sharing by 
being able to connect multiple organizations at the scene to enable better 
collaboration and information exchange. This network command is managed 
through the development and deployment of electronic command boards. 
Electronic command boards are essentially touch-screen computers with 
software designed and installed to allow for managing resources on the scene of 
a fire or emergency and also have the capacity through a secure wireless 
network to receive information from multiple sources in real time during a fire or 
emergency.  
A key finding of the research relative to TLO’s was illustrated in the 
Arizona model described earlier. A TLO responding with a laptop computer could 
complement the information being received on the electronic command board, 
becoming a critical component within the network command, particularly as it 
relates to the ability to receive sensitive and/or classified information. 
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The hub of the network command structure is the Fire Department 
Operations Center (FDOC), which is the FDNY’s high tech Emergency 
Operations Center possessing the ability to receive and transmit information in all 
three domains: voice, video and data. The FDOC can monitors communications, 
reviews video images, and searches multiple databases to feed the incident 
commander important information for decision-making purposes. The FDOC is 
essentially a data mining apparatus that can produce timely, relevant and 
actionable products for the incident commander. The director of the FDNY FDOC 
stated, “information needs to be departed meaningfully and very briefly” to be 
useful. In most cases, there is a five to fifteen minute window to provide critical 
information downrange to the incident commander to make better decisions. He 
also commented that if information or intelligence can be graphically oriented, it 
can be much more impactful, being able to “jump out” to the decision makers, 
which is one of the key benefits of the electronic command boards (T. Herlocker, 
personal communication, April 28, 2010). In addition to the internal benefit of the 
FDOC to the FDNY, it provides information to external partners. As an example, 
in October 2006, New York Yankees pitcher Cory Lidle accidentally crashed his 
private plane into a Manhattan high-rise residential building. During the initial 
stages of the incident first responders needed to know if this crash might have 
had a nexus to terrorism to make appropriate strategic and tactical decisions. 
Homeland security officials in Washington, D.C. were interested in receiving 
information from the scene to develop situational awareness at the federal level. 
The FDOC was able to connect multiple agencies in the local metropolitan area 
for briefings and also posted situation and progress reports on HSIN so that 
responders all across the nation who access HSIN could be informed about the 
situation in New York. This mechanism was also used for the “Miracle on the 
Hudson” in January 2009, when U.S. Airways Flight 1549 made an emergency 
landing in the Hudson River (Pfeifer, 2009).  
The above incidents provide evidence that contrasts what occurred on 
9/11 at the World Trade Center where police department helicopters, from their 
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vantage point, were able to assess that the towers were in imminent danger of 
collapse. At that time, no formal procedure existed for that information to be 
shared with fire department incident commanders. If that information could have 
been shared quickly and efficiently, it is possible that more first responder’s lives 
could have been saved. “Possessing information has been a traditional sign of 
power, which has led to information silos. In a network world, however, power is 
attained not by hoarding information, but by distributing accurate information to 
many organizations as quickly as possible. This paradigm shift is vital during fires 
and disasters, where emergency responders depend on a network command to 
connect to information systems and other organizations to assist in incident 
management” (Pfeifer, 2009, p.18).  
This complex and expensive model of network command may not be 
attainable by most fire service organizations due to fiscal constraints. It is 
presented to illustrate what is possible when intellectual talent and technological 
advances are joined in the interest of public and emergency responder safety. 
Perhaps on a regional or county level with funding through grant programs, 
similar models can be developed and implemented. (See Appendix C for an 
example of the information sharing capabilities of electronic command boards). 
 
Figure 11.   Network-Centric Command System (From: Pfeifer, 2009) 
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4. Internal Dissemination Mechanisms 
When information or intelligence suggests a credible threat exists to a 
jurisdiction or region, a method is needed to disseminate that to responders in 
the field quickly. Similarly, when an incident is happening in real time or has 
already happened, responders should be made aware to have a heightened 
state of alert when responding to other incidents.  
The FDNY has recently drafted a policy to accomplish this. The Phoenix, 
Arizona Fire Department uses a similar method. The methodology is termed an 
“Emergency Action Message” (EAM). The intent is to disseminate information to 
responders in the field prior to or post event of serious concern or of a nature of 
which all field units should be aware. The The on-duty citywide tour commander 
will order and draft the EAM, and it will be disseminated to all field units and other 
designated employees as necessary. The message will provide unclassified 
information to field units as a means to enhance their situational awareness 
during their daily activities and responses. It will be delivered via e-mail format 
over the fire department Intranet. This method allows for tracking and also allows 
for the local battalion and division chiefs to monitor and see if the message has 
been opened and read by each unit. Disseminating the message via e-mail over 
the Intranet provides a secure portal for the message relayed as FOUO. Units 
will be notified that an EAM is pending in their e-mail accounts via a message on 
the apparatus mobile data terminal (MDT) if out of quarters, or via the alarm 
teleprinter in quarters, voice intercom system, or fax machine. When receiving 
the message, the officer on duty will be directed to check the unit’s e-mail 
account to view the EAM. The message will not be announced on any radio 
frequency for security purposes. If the message is not read in a reasonable 
amount of time, the local battalion chief will follow up and ensure compliance. 
The EAM will be generic in nature to preclude a review of the material for 
sensitive content. As an example, the Times Square car bombing attempt in May 
2010 would result in a message to units about the incident and to be alert for 
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responses in high profile areas and to review standard operating procedures for 
responses to hazardous materials incidents or incidents involving improvised 
explosive devices (IED) (FDNY EAM Draft Policy, 2010).  
This methodology is very simple and quick to accomplish once accurate 
information is received and verified. E-mail was the preferred method identified 
by survey respondents for receiving intelligence and information quickly in the 
field. Most fire service organizations have this capability. Even in a volunteer fire 
department, the assumption can be made that e-mail is a contemporary way of 
communicating with responders (See Appendix D for a summary of 
recommendations). 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis has addressed the need for methodologies to disseminate 
intelligence and information to first responders to improve decision making and to 
enhance responder and public safety. Recommendations have been made on 
how this can be accomplished. Additional research areas exist. The development 
of training programs for fire service personnel in the field of intelligence warrants 
further research and development. Intelligence training for firefighters can 
enhance the response mission by providing them with the tools to receive 
intelligence products, which can enhance their understanding of the operational 
environment, and which should result in better decision-making, leading to 
increased safety and survival. The use of social networking to communicate 
during emergencies is also a technological medium for further exploration. The 
public has been engaged to provide real time information to emergency response 
organizations. How can social networking be utilized effectively by first 
responders during major disasters? How can funding be made more available to 
emergency service organizations for technology upgrades to more easily receive 
and disseminate information? Future research projects are limited to the 




The sharing of terrorism-related information has become a priority to the 
fire service. Stakeholders have recognized that one of the most effective ways to 
improve homeland security efforts is to create an environment in which external 
and internal information sharing are occurring at regular intervals. Recognition 
now exists that firefighters and emergency medical personnel are valuable 
assets in being able to collect information during the course of their daily duties. 
Representation at the federal level is occurring because of the FSIE initiative to 
ensure the receipt of intelligence and information to increase situational 
awareness to be better prepared to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents.  
The issues raised in this thesis related to information sharing and 
dissemination focus not on the ability to collect information but on the ability to 
properly and expeditiously disseminate it to the consumers of the information in 
the field. Fire chiefs, fire officers, firefighters, and emergency medical personnel 
all have the need to receive this type of information to remain vigilant and safe in 
the performance of their duties. Weaknesses exist in the methods by which 
relevant information is shared with first responders in the field. Historically, the 
fire service has relied on the chain of command for receiving and sharing 
information with field responders, which can create a barrier in the ability to have 
creative and viable problem solving ideas become good policy. To remove the 
barriers to solving problems, the fire service must be open to allowing a non-
traditional model of bottom up thinking and problem solving to occur.  
First responders need to be empowered and trusted with the ability to use 
new resources to increase the level of safety and situational awareness in the 
field. The recommendations proposed are practical solutions to assist in solving 
the identified challenges. One of the challenges for first responders on every 
response is that of the unknown. They rarely know exactly to what they are 
responding. They typically have information as to location and to what they are 
supposedly responding. If first responders can reduce the risks posed to them by 
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the unknown factors, their safety and the safety of the public can be improved. 
Receiving intelligence and information in a timely, simple and meaningful way 
before, during, and after an incident, increases the chances of making more 




APPENDIX A. STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1. What is the role of intelligence within your organization? 
2. What effect has the FSIE had on intelligence and information sharing for 
the fire service? 
3. Does your agency have trained Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLO)? If so, 
how and where do they receive their training? What are their duties and 
how do they interact with field responders? 
4. How does your agency disseminate intelligence? 
5. Are you aware of any models, other than your own agency, for intelligence 
sharing and dissemination currently being used in the fire service that 
have been successful? 
6. Does your agency have a representative in the local/regional fusion 
center? If not from your agency, is there a fire service representative? Is 
that person well received and a respected partner? 
7. Does your local fusion center produce intelligence that is valuable for the 
fire service? 
8. What type of intelligence should be shared with first responders? 
9. What would your recommendation be for an effective model for 
disseminating intelligence to field responders in a fire department? 
10. What is your opinion on the issue of security clearances for members of 
the fire service with intelligence responsibilities? Are security clearances 
necessary? 
11. What is the range of classifications or sensitive markings for the 
intelligence products you receive? 
12. Are you aware of any specific programs to train fire service personnel in 
the intelligence process? 
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APPENDIX B. SURVEY QUESTIONS 
1. What type of terrorism-related intelligence do you think firefighters and 
EMS personnel need in order to more safely perform their jobs? 
2. Do you feel that it would be valuable to receive intelligence briefings 
regularly and from who? 
3. How would you prefer to receive intelligence briefings, estimates and 
assessments? 
4. What would work best in your agency to disseminate intelligence to 
members in the field? 
5. Would regular intelligence briefings affect your daily operations? 
6. Does your agency provide terrorism awareness training to its personnel? If 
so how many hours? 
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APPENDIX C. ELECTRONIC COMMAND BOARD (ECB) 
The ECB enables the Incident Commander (IC) to have better situational 
awareness by showing graphic displays of the fire/emergency location within a 
building, floor plans, and mapping capabilities showing the surrounding 
structures and topography. Electronic command boards are essentially touch-
screen computers with software designed and installed to allow for managing 
resources on the scene of a fire or emergency and also have the capacity 
through a secure wireless network to receive information from multiple sources in 
real time during a fire or emergency. The following screen shots are some 
examples of what the IC can display. In addition, the FDNY Fire Department 
Operations Center has the capability to send the IC graphically-oriented 
















































Fire Location – 4th Floor 
Units Operating 
Evacuation Stairway Incident 
Commander 
IC will receive a graphically displayed alert 







































Figure 14.   Overhead View of the Structure and Surrounding Structures 




APPENDIX D. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
• Establish secure portal on IAFC website 
• IAFC and NFA sponsored intelligence training 
• Develop TLO, FLO, ILO training programs 
• Provide fire department points of contact for FSIE 
• Use of technology for disseminating intelligence 
• HSIN 
• EMR-ISAC 
• Electronic Command Boards 
• Internal dissemination mechanisms 
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